Abstract
With the objective of contributing towards strengthening subsequent African-led interventions in the larger framework of African Solutions to African Problems, this paper engages critical discourse analysis in a reflection on the durability or otherwise of the 2016 UNSC-backed ECOWAS-AU intervention, which mediated in the aftermath of President Yahya Jammeh’s refusal to accept presidential elections which he lost in The Islamic Republic of The Gambia. This case is analyzed in close comparison with circumstances leading former Liberian President Charles Taylor into exile before being hauled to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for trial. Both cases are investigated in the light of human rights, “African Hospitality,” impunity, deterrence and durability of such ad hoc interventions. It calibrates the strength of “African Hospitality” against international norms/law and examines the place of precedents and their possible implications on future occurrences. It makes the case that while the span of “African Hospitality” needs to be properly defined for exhaustive clarity, such interventions as those that encouraged former Charles Taylor to seek exile in Nigeria as well as the one that persuaded Yahyah Jammeh to seek exile in Guinea need to be configured such that they reflect the African Union’s avowed position of zero tolerance for illegitimate regime change and its fight against impunity. It identifies that both the Liberian and Gambian interventions share shortcomings along fault lines of human rights, durability, impunity and deterrence. The study concludes that the failure to address these concerns could weaken public confidence in such interventions and compromise the interventions' durability. It proffers a portfolio of policy interventions that could strengthen such prospective interventions.
Keywords: Durable Peace, Election Integrity, Human Rights, Deterrence, Impunity.
Introduction
In 2016, president Yahya Jammeh’s refusal to recognize presidential election results, which he lost, incurred the wrath of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). It courted international condemnation, culminating in a UNSC-backed ECOWAS AU intervention. This paper examines the extent to which the intervention effectively addresses concerns of (i) human rights, (ii) impunity, (iii) deterrence and (iv) durability in Africa. These benchmarks are critical because they are inherent in the AU’s philosophy of African Solutions to African Problems (AfSol) in its renewed flagship interest of zero tolerance for impunity, coup d’états and abhorrence for undemocratic regime change. This paper analyzes what it perceives could pass for a possible lacuna that might be exploited in the name of precedence in subsequent times. The overall objective is to contribute to shaping policy interventions toward addressing the identified benchmarks in a more exhaustive manner. The paper derives inspiration from the latter part of Point 14 of the Protocol, which calls for the pursuit of continuous peaceful and political resolution of the crisis. 1 It examines the extent to which Points 13, 12, 11, 9, 8 and especially 7 of the Protocol contribute to the quest for durable peace in The Gambia and Africa. This is even more critical given that presidential elections in Africa appear to make global headlines for election-related violence.
Source: http://www.3rdwarescouts.org.uk/gambia/index.php?page=Medina+Sering+Mass
Country: Islamic Republic of The Gambia.
Region: West Africa.
Capital: Banjul.
Current President: Adama Barrow
(Since 2017).
Immediate past President: Yahya Jammeh.
Population: Under Two Million.
Size: 4000 sq miles
(Approximately).
One of Africa’s smallest countries with an area of about 4,000 square miles, The Gambia lies between latitudes 13 and 14 degrees north and latitudes 13 and 17 degrees west. It is a small strip of land mass, almost entirely engulfed by Senegal, except for some 50 miles of coastline washed by the Atlantic Ocean in the westernmost part of West Africa. It is popular for its
friendly beaches, which attract thousands of international tourists.
Brief Background to the Crises The Gambia’s political narrative under discussion traces its historical antecedents to the 1 st December 2016 presidential elections in which former president Yahya
Jammeh disregarded the democratic voice of the electorates. His 22-year reign as president suffered a nose dive as he lost power for which he initially conceded defeat. On 5 th December, the country’s electoral commission revised the results following counting irregularities that were reported in some areas.
However, the recount did not impeach the overall outcome of the election, as it left Adama Barrow in a clear lead. Yet Yahya Jammeh declined that verdict. This was to set the tone for The Gambia’s crisis as it provoked panic, which dashed hopes for the renaissance of a peaceful and functioning democracy. Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh himself has a political history dating as far back as 22 nd July 1994 when he enthroned himself as president by ousting The Gambia’s first president, Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, in a bloodless coup d’état. By 1996, he had metamorphosed into an elected president, winning his second term in 2001 in a largely considered free and fair election. In 2006, he won a third term as president and survived a fourth consecutive presidential term in 2011 in a widely criticized election. Then, in 2016, he failed in his bid to wield power, but he refused to concede defeat. Results declared by the country’s Independent Electoral Commission put Adama Barrow at 263,515 votes (45.5%); Yahyah Jammeh at 212,099 (36.7%); and a third candidate, Mama Kandeh at 102,969 (17.8%). 2 On 9 th December, however, Yahya Jammeh uttered and stood by a dramatic declaration which would eventually catapult him into exile: “After thorough investigation, I have decided to reject the outcome of the recent election. I lament serious and unacceptable abnormalities which have reportedly transpired during the electoral process … I recommend.
Locating the Crisis in Continental Context
In order to appreciate the Gambian crisis, it is appropriate to recall portraits of Africa’s post-colonial governance trajectory since they have close cognates with the continent’s political and historical overview. Africa’s post independence political treatise is replete with distasteful accounts of military coup d’états and of leaders, some of whom have held onto power by fair or foul means, including by usurping state machinery and state institutions to fortify their illegitimate occupancy of the presidency. Others have altered the state Constitution to give illegitimate legitimacy to their reign through unpopular referenda. Such challenges have been recorded in Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Togo and Uganda 3 .
In some cases, military leaders who seized political power through the barrel of a gun ended up transforming themselves into civilian rulers. The then Gambia’s president was a former military leader who led The Gambia first as a military leader and Chairman of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) from 1994.
In Ghana, a country credited as a beckon for democracy in West Africa, the late Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings came into leadership through a military coup d’état not once but twice: first on 4 th June 1979, then on 31 st December 1981. He presided over the affairs of the country and peacefully handed over power to democratically-elected Dr. Hilla Babini Limann, only to be dethroned by the same Jerry John Rawlings who had earlier handed over power to him. Rawlings then disowned his military posture in favour of civilian leadership and subsequently won two consecutive presidential elections in 1992 and 1996, serving a total of two decades before he peacefully handed over power at the end of a constitutionally mandated two terms in office. Several democratic elections have since characterized Ghana’s governance system. This has not been the case in other parts of Africa. In Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Gabriel Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe for four straight decades short of only three years, until he was literarily forced out of power by the military amidst days of public protests. A Black Nationalist leader, he established a one-party state over which he presided as president until 21 st November 2017, when he bowed to military and political pressures in a revolt that revolved around accusations that he was making skirmishes to position his wife, Grace Mugabe, who had managed to become so politically active, rising rapidly to evolve as head of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 4 , thus making her an automatic member of the Union’s politburo, to succeed him. Adem K Abebe 5 bemoans the syndrome of seeking extended mandate over what Constitutional provisions because it is suggestive that Africa is far from dismantling the (in) famous practice of “president for life”, often characterized by suffocating effects on democracy and stability coupled with oppression and shrinking of civil and political liberties among others. As he notes, Africa is home to as many as seven of the ten longest-serving presidents in the world, citing the likes of Cameroon’s Paul Biya, who has been in power since 1982, and Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, holding onto power since 1979, but he also admits: Numerous other African countries replicate different forms of such worrying circumstances. In the end, they tend to tarnish credible elections while assuming postures of power-drunk incumbency. Such has been Africa’s post-colonial leadership snapshots, which have partly led to a series of military coup d’états, ‘justified’ as one of the only viable options for getting rid of despotic regimes, but it is also a system which the newly established AU abhors.
In the last two decades, the continent, through the African Union (AU), has developed relatively effective ways of putting a halt to unconstitutional changes of government in the form of coups d’état. This policy effectively protects incumbent leaders. However the AU has yet to successfully tackle the problem of imperial presidencies.
Regional Intervention in the Gambia
Grounded in the vision of ensuring peace, good governance, and development in Africa, the continent’s leadership took historic steps earlier in 2002 to disestablish the then ineffective Organization of African Unity (OAU) and replaced it with a more effective African Union 6 , whose Constitutive Act equipped it with enhanced administrative mechanisms that empower it to intervene in matters of member states than its predecessor, including in cases of unconstitutional changes of government. This epresented an important departure from the then
OAU’s “ineffective” doctrine of non-interference to a more engaging doctrine of non-indifference. The AU has since sought to carve a niche for itself in regional interventions 7 and the evolving philosophy of African Solutions to African Problems (AfSol). This enhanced mandate of the AU justified and facilitated the UNSC-backed ECOWAS-AU regional intervention in the aftermath of Gambia’s post-2016 presidential election. Thus in a well-coordinated diplomatic intervention which ensured an eventual transfer of political power from ex-president Yahya Jammeh to president Adama Barrow, the former’s regime had been effectively dismantled such that even his own kith and kin African leaders failed to rally behind him. Even the Gambian army, over which he once superintended as Commander-in-Chief, tactically or technically shied away from offering him the anticipated loyalty as combined regional forces headed to The Gambian frontiers without facing the slightest resistance. Sustained and scaled-up pressure, with some African forces deploying combat equipment to the troubled state and intensified negotiations, eventually struck him to
cooperate in bringing finality to his 22-year leadership dominance. So it came to pass that Yahya Jammeh finally fled into exile in Equatorial Guinea via Guinea Conakry on 21 st January 2017, in accordance with Point 12 of the 14-point Joint Protocol on the Gambia.
Inauguration of Adama Barrow in the Gambian Embassy in Senegal
Three days earlier, on 19 th January, amidst tensions and uncertainties, President Adama Barrow was made to take the Oath of Office as President of the Republic of The Gambia at the Gambian Embassy in neighbouring Dakar-Senegal. It was an unprecedented ceremony attended by Western Ambassadors to Senegal, the UN envoy for West Africa, and ECOWAS officials. To a large extent, the event endorsed the dearth of concern that the ECOWAS, AU, and the international community have regarding illegitimate leadership. It is particularly of great concern to this paper that, by this
event, The Gambia has become one of the fewest African countries that have ever witnessed such symbolic political power transfer, except perhaps for what transpired at independence on 18 th February 1965. Sadly, the subsequent swearing-in of President Adama Barrow into office in his native Gambia on the day that commemorated the country’s independence anniversary at the independence stadium, unfortunately, did not serve this purpose either: It was an inauguration which only added to the checkered political history of The Gambia that throughout its two decades of independence, it had never witnessed a political handing over ceremony. Then again, of the only two presidents it has ever had since independence, one was sworn into office twice: once on Senegalese soil, then the other on The Gambian soil.
An Appraisal of the 14-Point Protocol
The prime place of this joint intervention is neither being contested nor underestimated. In the opinion of this paper, the intervention marks one of the most fulfilling tasks which the AU has undertaken since its coming into being. It is also particularly significant for several reasons, especially as it demonstrates the AU’s capacity to engage in peaceful interventions and appropriate dialoguing mechanisms, even at the peak of political upheavals within member states. Next, it lends legitimacy to the AU's resolve to effectively implement its flagship founding doctrine of non-indifference inherent in its Constitutive Act. It further demonstrates promising leverage of the willingness of African leaders to deal with African problems tactfully. On the whole, it contributes significantly to demonstrating that Africa’s leadership is coming to terms with the fact that if lasting peace and democracy are to prevail, then the sanctity of electoral credibility must be allowed to reign above all other interests at all times. The fact that the intervention was successful without shedding even a single drop of blood is particularly held in high esteem by proponents of peace. While some international institutions, well-meaning figures, and thousands of people the world over generally lauded the intervention as a historical milestone and a victory for democracy in West Africa, others have hailed it, especially for its peaceful character. For instance, at the end of a two-day Board meeting of the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) in the Senegalese capital, Dakar, on 25 th and 26 th January 2017, the first of its 10-point resolution noted in part: “The Board highly commends the ECOWAS for its resilient efforts that ensured the resolution of the Gambian political crisis and the peaceful transfer of power to H.E. President Adama Barrow, who won the December 1, 2016 presidential elections…” 8 Chair of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, on his part, expressed hope that this would herald the beginning of socio-economic development based on respect for human rights, freedom of expression and the rule of law, adding: “However, this demarche should not in any way condone impunity for violations, atrocities and abuses that are related to the 22 years of authoritarian rule…” 9 Cameron Duodu, a well-respected Ghanaian journalist, commended ECOWAS for being able to get rid of Yahya Jammeh without firing a single shot and opined that this should count as one of the greatest achievements of ECOWAS. He observes that the West African regional block’s strict posture on the issue is admirable and adds: “The block needs to devise ways by which citizens of a misruled nation can get back their money and justice from a fleeing tyrant 10. It is fairly self-evident that despite its remarkable successes, the intervention leaves in its wake some grey areas which, when not given appropriate and delicate
attention, could be usurped into luring The Gambia back into bedlams. This paper joins the thousands of peace proponents worldwide in applauding the joint, determined and sustained initiative for a well-executed task. However, to promote enhanced intervention strategies for future interventions, this paper leaps further to walk a path less walked by generally appraising portions of the Declaration and the intervention.
Was it a Tale of one Gambia with two Presidents?
It is the contention of this paper that The Republic of The Gambia had been made to assume a delicate situation of “one Gambia with two presidents” at the time of President Adama Barrow’s inauguration: one in the person of Yahya Jammeh, then holding onto power and resident at the Presidential Palace in Banjul, and the other, Adama Barrow, lurking in self-imposed exile in neighbouring Dakar-Senegal. This paper respectfully believes that an enhanced aura of human security could have prevailed if this dualism was averted, given its capacity to have triggered violent clashes between followers of both leaders, especially viewed against the teaming followership of Yahya Jammeh even at his point of departure into exile. Convictions for this concern reside in the ruinous account of how Liberia was enmeshed in an eight-year (1989-1997) Civil War which left about 250,000 deaths 11 . It is recalled that this deadly engagement survived on the orders of two faction leaders whose dictates and wishes were so atrociously executed with blighted devotion by their various rebel supporters. Sadly, 1999 opened the corridors to a second wave of this intrastate war in which once again, as is in many violent conflicts, it was the rebel groups who represented the followership of their respective leaders, who held peace to ransom by unleashing violence and heinous crimes against innocent unarmed civilians, sometimes spreading into neighbouring states. Similar circumstances are traceable to innumerable intrastate wars fought across Africa, as happened in Sierra Leone’s civil wars, notably 1991-2002. The highnumber of votes secured in favour of Yahya Jammeh, together with those who might not have voted for Adama Barrow, indicated that Yahyah Jammeh wielded substantial followers. The sheer number of Gambians who still demonstrated allegiance to the fleeing Yahya Jammeh demonstrates this. It suggests an indication that there could have been high casualty levels if Yahya Jammeh had wanted to fight back, though he would have still lost.
Relevance of this Concern
Concerns for this paper are invoked, among others, by the fact that, on 16 th January 2020, Deutsche Welle (DW), one of Germany’s most authoritative international broadcasters, published a write-up captioned: “Gambia: Thousands march for ex-ruler Yahya Jammeh’s return.” The write-up reveals the power of followership and the extent to which such a support base could go. In it, a purported 26-year-old supporter of the exiled Yahya Jammeh is quoted as telling the AFP: “We need [Jammeh] 100 percent. We are ready to die for him”. For emphasis, the second and third paragraphs of the write-up are quoted below: “Yahya Jammeh supporters in Gambia gathered on the outskirts of the capital, Banjul, on Thursday carrying banners, placards and photographs of the former president, who ruled from 1994 until January 2017 when he fled into exile. The protesters from the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction party (APRC) demanded that regional and international bodies honour an agreement allowing Jammeh, who is in exile in Equatorial Guinea, to return”.
The above quote is reported to be a follow-up to audio in which exiled Yahya Jammeh asserted his right to return to The Gambia, citing the Joint Declaration under discussion, which had made rounds the previous week. Other portions read: “Before Jammeh left here for exile, there was an agreement for him to come back into the country after three years,” she said, referring to a promise by the United Nations, together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), to work with Gambia’s government to ensure Jammeh is “at liberty to return to The Gambia at any time of his choosing”.
In a sharp rebuttal, however, spokesperson Ebrima Sankareh indicates that the Government never signed any such document, emphasizing: “Jammeh “consistently references an accord that he claimed was signed by UN, AU and ECOWAS, and Gambia’s government as well,” … “I have talked to President Barrow about it, and the president has never signed any accord or agreement with President Jammeh. He [Barrow] has never seen one and has never been shown one…”
He told BBC that if Yahya Jammeh returns to The Gambia without permission, “the Gambian government cannot guarantee his safety and security.” Meanwhile, Mr. Jatta, the interim leader of Mr. Jammeh’s Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction party, contends that Mr. Jammeh should be allowed to live in peace in The Gambia rather than be put on trial over allegations of human rights abuses, warning that any attempt to arrest Mr. Jammeh would lead to "bloodshed", emphasizing: “Nobody will dare to arrest him.” All these eventually elicit legitimate questions such as: What are the limitations to Yahya Jammeh’s right to return to The Gambia, especially as a former Head of State and a native? Who determines Yahyah Jammeh’s right to return to The Gambia, and after how long? What is the scope of understanding for using the word “Temporary” as used in paragraph 12 of the Declaration? To what extent does his return to The Gambia at any given point threaten or not threaten the relative peace in The Gambia? Within what parameters should his return be sanctioned, considering point 12 of the Declaration? It would appear that such seeming indefiniteness in portions of the Declaration leaves a communication gap that could be exploited to the advantage of whoever invokes it to the detriment of the other. Consider again that: Whereas Point 8 of the Protocol states: “ECOWAS, the AU and the UN commit to work with the Government of The Gambia to prevent the seizure of assets and properties lawfully belonging to former President Jammeh or his family and those of his Cabinet members, government officials and Party supporters, as guaranteed under the Constitution and other Laws of The Gambia”;
Point 9 provides that:
“In order to avoid any recriminations, ECOWAS, the AU and the UN commit to work with the Government of the Gambia on national reconciliation to cement social, cultural and national cohesion.
Cognizant that one of the fundamental objectives of the Constitutive Act of the AU is to condemn and reject impunity, this paper is concerned about the extent to which Point 8 contributes to addressing the impunity conundrum. In order to make the portion that emphasizes prevention of seizure of lawful asserts locally relevant to the Gambian scheme of affairs as it stands, perhaps there ought to have been some elements of accountability which effectively established what lawfully belongs to Yahya Jammeh and his regime members so that they are not unnecessarily “harassed” for what legitimately belongs to them. Unfortunately, the Declaration appears either silent or unclear on this. his paper contemplates that if the doctrine of rejecting impunity must succeed, a provision that downplays accountability in any form undermines the march against impunity by upholding an implied indemnity or immunity. On account of this, the paper opines that
Provision 7 of the Protocol sadly fails to advance this important cause. The paper is inclined to believe that President Adama Barrow’s declaration of intent to establish a Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) to investigate any possible crimes committed by Yahya Jammeh, yet cautioning non-prosecution might be interpreted as tacitly endorsing essential elements of immunity and impunity: Otherwise, how does the world determine what rightly belongs to Yahya Jammeh and what does not, especially at a time when he already stands accused in the court of some public for allegedly depleting the Gambia’s economic wealth by flying away a fleet of luxury cars and other items that were reportedly loaded into a cargo plane at his behest? How does the Gambia reconcile with news that his departure was associated with the disappearance of huge sums of money from The Gambia’s state coffers within weeks of his hesitant departure? How does The Gambia deal with legacies of alleged human rights abuses for which Yahya Jammeh’s regime stands accused? These are legitimate concerns whose exhaustive answers would add finesse to the Declaration while advancing the AU’s avowed stance against impunity.
As Point 7 provides, “ECOWAS, the AU and the UN urge the Government of The Gambia to take all necessary measures to ensure that there is no intimidation, harassment of former regime members and supporters, in conformity with the Constitution and other laws of The Gambia” Without prejudice, the intent and investigation of alleged crimes could be interpreted as tacit “harassment” and “intimidation”. If this is right, then the premises of the intended TRRC would appear potentially moribund at birth and may not inure to the needed durable peace, rule of law and social justice. This is because, with time, these polemic intervention strategies would have set distasteful precedents that could become the norm rather than the exception. It is imperative that this is prevented by ensuring that effective deterrence is upheld where and when applicable to promote accountability.
Is “African hospitality”: a Case for Immunity or Impunity?
1) Point 10 of the Protocol speaks to the idea of offering “African hospitality” and states:
“ECOWAS, the AU and the UN underscore strongly the important role of the Gambian Defense and Security Forces in the maintenance of peace and stability of The Gambia and commit to work
with the Government of The Gambia to ensure that it takes all appropriate measures to work to ensure that host countries that offer “African hospitality” to former President Jammeh and his family do not become undue targets of harassment, intimidation and all other pressures and sanctions, support the maintenance of the integrity of the [Defense and] Security Forces and guard against all measures that can create division and a breakdown of order”
Learning from how precedents impact comparable subsequent events, and especially because this intervention is African-led and could be seen positively in the limelight of Afsol, this paper seeks to question the extent and context of “African hospitality” as used: “What exactly does ‘African hospitality’ constitute, especially captured in inverted commas?” This inquiry finds legitimacy in precedence reminiscent of a June 2003 incident when Nigeria offered asylum, or call it “African hospitality” to former Liberian president Charles Ghankey Taylor in a slightly comparable circumstance, also as a way of fostering peace in the then war-torn Liberia. It took the international community, and especially the human rights fraternity, only a short time to proclaim that Nigeria’s act of “African hospitality” was inconsistent with international law and, therefore, could not be sustained. Facts of the case under reference are that, under the auspices of African leadership, led by then Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and former South African president Thabo Mbeki, and some members of theinternational community, a peace deal was brokered within some specific parameters that encouraged Charles Taylor to relinquish his presidency of Liberia, leave and never directly or indirectly interfere with Liberia’s politics for the sake of peace. This was underpinned by assurances that Charles Taylor would be granted safety from arrest and prosecution. It also entailed the provision of a safe and reasonable accommodation in Nigeria for himself and his family for the foreseeable future. Two years into that “foreseeable future”, the pressure was mounted from within and outside Africa, arguing that Nigeria’s provision of asylum (African hospitality) to Charles Taylor was an attempt to shield him and was inconsistent with international law 12 . There was an outpour of public outcry from interest groups, notably Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) rejecting this ‘African hospitality’. In a public document dated 11 th August 2005, Amnesty International, under the banner
of Campaign Against Impunity, submitted: “Two years after Liberian President Charles Taylor fled for exile in Nigeria, Nigerian President Obasanjo should no longer allow Taylor to escape prosecution for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war” 13 .
The opening statement of paragraph 4 of the afore-mentioned document noted further: “Nigeria is swimming against the tide of international justice…It is high time Nigeria did the right thing… ” This evokes the dilemma that if the trump card for pursuing Charles Taylor’s departure from Liberia was in the interest of peace, how different is the case of Yahya Jammeh, and how did Charles Taylor’s case eventually involve pursuing human rights? Whether the case for Yahya Jammeh will remain at the level of peace or it will eventually tow the footprints of Charles Taylor, only time will tell, but what would be the locus of the current “African hospitality” under which Yahya Jammeh resides in exile? Believing that durable peace and its derivatives are some of the highest aspirations
among the world’s virtues, such establishment and sustenance are driven by people and their social arrangements, including political order. This justifies durable peace as a process rather than an event, and just as Galtung (2000) observes: Peace is a revolutionary idea; peace by peaceful means defines that revolution as nonviolent. That revolution is taking place all the time; our job is to expand it in scope and domain ... to work for peace is to work against violence by analyzing its forms and causes, predicting in order to prevent it, and then acting preventively and curatively since peace relates to violence much as health relates to illness (Galtung, 2000: xi). This quote resonates with the position of this paper that durable peace can neither be established in a vacuum nor be built upon frameworks of injustices and disregard for human rights. Identifying with and taking inspiration from the reasoning that peace is not the mere absence of manifest war or violence, this paper sees the need to tackle the imperatives for seeking the establishment of structures and policies that have the capacity to contain a durable regime of positive peace in a post-Yahya Jammeh Gambia. This lends true meaning to the objective of the 14-Point Joint Declaration on The Gambia towards “reaching a peaceful resolution to the political situation in The Gambia”. The same should
hold in comparable circumstances in the rest of Africa. In this context, therefore, some pertinent questions that have already been raised include:“How does The Gambia deal with the legacies of decades of alleged human rights abuses, atrocities and other crimes levelled against the Yahya Jammeh regime? If not handled well, these unanswered questions could become the Achilles’ Heels of the Joint Declaration. This paper is afraid that this might come back to hurt the intended objectives of the Declaration in the future. They could also potentially compromise the streams of trust when applied to a comparable situation in the future. This paper's position is that if such interventions are to be effective and sustainable, then such Declarations must show robust in-built mechanisms that should not leave questions subject to future interpretations. In this regard, the scope and span of “African Hospitality” should be exhaustively well-defined and not framed ambiguously. Particularly, how do all these relate to news making rounds that the Gambian Government intends to prosecute ex-dictator Yahya Jammeh? 14
Durability and Lessons Learnt
Lessons learnt from the two “African hospitality” contexts discussed lead this paper to contemplate the extent to which the Gambian intervention inures to the realization of durable peace. Learning from the Liberian context, it is unclear the extent of durability that the intervention might have had were it not for Charles Taylor’s failed escape attempt and his consequent arrest and surrender to the ICC. In the hypothetical case that he had managed to return to Liberia, the durability of peace could have suffered. Again, if he had successfully fled from Nigeria, durable peace would have been in question, irrespective of where Charles Taylor might have found himself. In the context of The Gambia, if the Declaration as implemented so far is robust enough to withstandpossible agitations comparable to the Liberian situation, that might be good enough. However, should The Gambia later follow in the footprints of Liberia, what would become the fate of Yahya Jammeh? Would other African leaders be convinced enough when offered “African Hospitality”? When does “African Hospitality” become good or bad? “African Hospitality” truly needs clarity. To what extent could future Declarations contain the interests of perpetrators and victims? These are food for thought whose responses would be considered in an intended Part II of this paper. Until then, however, there is certainly the need for change, but where do we find the needed change?
Theory of Change and Deterrence
This paper draws on the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017 to propose a theory of change. UNDAF identifies the theory of change as a method that explains how a given intervention, or set of interventions, is expected to lead to a specific development change, drawing on a causal analysis based on the available evidence (United Nations Development Assistance Framework [UNDAF 2017]). In order to make such actions as discussed above unattractive to leaders who might be considering variants of such actions, this paper proposes the incorporation of the theory of change in ad hoc intervention documents such that, rather than almost entirely ‘pampering’ offending leaders out of office, the intervention protocols should consider incorporating bold statements that warn perpetrators of the implications of their actions and inactions. This will ensure that perpetrators are not seen to be shielded with immunity for life. The theory of change should incorporate essential elements of deterrence that make such conduct unattractive to potential perpetrators. As Stachowiak (2010) notes, the theory of change as a
concept has strong roots in multiple disciplines with increasing connections with sociology and political science. Deterrence in itself is seen as a strategy to shape another’s perception of cost and benefits to persuade threatening behaviour (Kersanskav (2020: 9). This makes deterrence useful here because its operational model is one of preventive rather than responsive, thereby creating a forward-looking and strategic approach (Kersanskav (2020: 7). By engaging deterrence as part of the theory of change, both concepts complement each other in reinforcing the AU’s renewed interest in zero tolerance for undemocratic regimes. Next, the principal factor that underpins deterrence will ensure that the cost of an undemocratic regime is higher than that of the other way round. This will provide reasonable caution in the minds of potential perpetrators regarding perceived immunity while assuring the citizenry of no indemnity.
Conclusions
This paper submits that the pursuit of accountability, justice and human rights must not be disengaged from the quest for durable peace in Africa; otherwise, the continent might end up pursuing negative peace at the expense of a flourishing positive peace. At over 60 years of political independence, Africa has come of age and must be seen to be doing the right things at the right times. Africa’s resolve to adapt representative democracy underpins the view that the continent and its leadership appreciate elections as one of the linchpins around which democracy revolves. Therefore, it must unlearn the disrespect for dictates of democratic decisions through the electoral process. Africa’s leadership must learn to appreciate that political power is only transient and not a preserve; that if they refuse to relinquish power when due, time and circumstances will eventually repudiate and condemn them to their fate. AU leadership must maintain and strengthen tough,
decisive postures with despotic regimes, albeit tactfully and peacefully, with coercive diplomacy rather than the threat of a combined force. African leaders must at all times envisage being held accountable for their commissions and omissions during their tenure of office. The 2017 UNSC-backed ECOWAS-AU Protocol on the Gambia is most appropriate. However, Points 13, 12, 11, 9, 8 and 7, as discussed above, leave a penumbra of unclarity and uncertainty in the beautiful skies under which the good people of The Gambia currently live in relative peace. This detracts from the otherwise excellent shine and finesse of the Declaration and its implementation. If poorly managed, this detraction could come back to haunt and hurt the good people of The Gambia.
Policy Recommendations
On account of the above discussions, it is hereby recommended for subsequent interventions that:
(1) As much as possible, interventions that seem to create ‘double leadership’ simultaneously should be avoided so that followership of the factions do not take undue advantage to unleash violence and disorder;
(2) In the context of an exiling Head of State, the provision of explicit modalities for his or her return to the native country in line with international human rights law and the Constitution of the state involved would help preserve peace and order;
(3) Providing for concerns relating to probity, accountability, and justice in line with the fight against impunity might be helpful in securing promises for sustainable peace;
(4) In some cases, it is important that offenders are held accountable for their commissions and or omissions;
(5) One challenge facing many African states has to do with the “election security and credibility deficits” of the electoral system. For instance, whether Yahya Jammeh’s call for a recount of
election results was legitimate or not, the recount altered the final results, and though its magnitude was not substantial enough to overturn the results, it failed to protect and promote the entire electoral system in its well-deserved trust and integrity. This is very critical, and though not the responsibility of the Declaration, it serves a good purpose forstakeholders to strengthen the integrity of elections.
References
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1 See Appendix 1 for full version of the Joint Declaration.
2 “Gambia’s Jammeh loses to Adama Barrow in shock election result”
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38183906
Retrieved: 11 th November, 2020. fresh and transparent elections which a God-fearing and independent electoral commission will officiate.”
3 “Tampering with national constitutions is a threat to stability in Africa”.
Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/tampering-national-constitutions-threat-stability-africa
Retrieved 20 th May, 2021.
4 The ZANU-PF is a political organization which remained Zimbabwe’s ruling party since the country attained political independence from white minority in 1980. The Organization was led for many years by Robert Mugabe, first Prime Minister with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU): then as president from 1987 after a merger with the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). However, the name ZANU-PF was retained throughout the reign of Mugabe.
5 Adem K. Abebe “Africa’s attempts to abandon practice of presidents for life suffers another setback”
Available at: https://theconversation.com/africas-attempts-to-abandon-practice-of-presidents-for-life-suffer-another-setback-144434
Retrieved:15 th November, 2020.
6 The AU is the African Union which had come to replace the OAU in 2002.
7 Appendix 2 provides for various AU interventions on the continent.
8 The Gambia: MFWA Commends ECOWAS, Urges President Barrow To Undertake Reforms, Available at: http://peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201702/304953.php
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9 Mo Ibrahim Salutes Gambians, Commends ECOWAS.
Available at: http://m.myjoyonline.com/marticles/world/mo-ibrahim-salutes-gambians-commends-ecowas
Retrieved: 20 th March, 2017.
10 Cameron Duodu, Available at: https://www.pambazuka.org/democracy-governance/ecowas-has-done-well-%E2%80%A6
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11 Liberia Country Profile, Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13729504
Retrieved: 11 th November, 2020.
12 Amnesty International Press Release, “Liberia: Nigeria’s offer of “asylum” to President Taylor flouts international law”
Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr340152003en.pdf
Accessed: 2nd February, 2024.
13 Amnesty International Press Release, AFR 44/o18/2005, News Service No 219.
14 Gambian Government plans to prosecute ex-dictator Jammeh, Available at: https://www.africanews.com/2022/05/26/gambian-government-plans-to-prosecute-ex-dictator-jammeh/
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